Abstract. In this paper we study solution attempts for a problem posed by Ali Enayat: can there be a finitely axiomatized consistent sequential theory that interprets itself plus the (sentential or non-uniform) Tarski biconditionals? We provide a basic framework for the study of this question and discuss some solution attempts. We connect the question with some interesting conjectures. We briefly touch upon what happens if we consider uniform biconditionals.
Also, the problem fits, at the lower end, in the broader logico-philosophical program of research into truth theories. It is, in a sense, about the informativeness of the minimal typed truth theory.
Along a different line, I think it is time logicians would look a bit more at sentential schemes (in some broad sense). These often behave differently from their uniform brethren. The primary example of a sentential scheme is parameter-free induction. See, e.g., [KPD88] , [Bek96] and [CFL11] . For a sllightly different, but related, study, see [Vis14a] .
• The paper provides the basic framework for the study of Ali's question. It is good to have these things out of the way.
• If a reader would want to try her hand on the problem, the attempts contained in the paper would at least spare her the time to rediscover those.
• In Section 7, we develop Saccheri style what an 'Enayat world' would look like. This provides some further basics that can play a role in a solution.
• In the study of this problem, errors are everywhere dense. Especially, one has to keep the dependencies of the complexities of the various items involved in an argument straight. (I often had the illusion of having solved the problem for days, but then a subtle circularity of dependencies turned up.) The paper provides, I hope, an example of good practice in keeping track of dependencies.
• I feel some of the arguments in the paper are definitely entertaining. A good example is the proof of Theorem 8.8.
In Section 5, we have a brief look at what happens when we consider uniform biconditionals. In a subsequent paper, I hope to give a fuller picture.
Basics
In this section, we provide the basic framework for the study of Enayat theories.
2.1. Theories, translations and interpretations. Theories are, in our paper, theories of first order predicate logic of finite signature that are given by a sufficiently simple set of axioms, say ∆ b 1 . In the few cases where we diverge from this format it will be explcitly mentioned. The axiom set is part of the data of a theory.
We refer the reader for a discussion of translations and interpretations to one of our papers [Vis13] or [Vis17] or [Vis18b] or [Vis18a] . Here we just fix some notations.
• We write U V for U interprets V .
• We write Γ U ∆ for Γ interprets ∆ over U , i.o.w., (U + Γ) (U + ∆). Here Γ and ∆ will be, in the typical case, sets of sentences, each with a signature that is an extension of the signature of U .
• We write Γ ◮ U ∆ for Γ Fujimoto interprets ∆ over U . This means that we have an identity-preserving, unrelativised interpretation of U + ∆ in U + Γ that preserves the vocubulary of U . Here Γ and ∆ have signatures that extend the signature of U .
• loc stands for local interpretability and dir stands for direct interpretability. Direct interpretability is unrelativized and identity preserving interpretability. We allow more-dimensional direct interpretability.
• We use ⊲⊳ for mutual interpretability and ◮ ◭ for mutual Fujimoto interpretability.
2
Some knowledge of the book [HP93] is definitely useful.
2.2. Vaughtness and sequentiality. In this subsection we define Vaught theories and sequential theories. We refer the reader to [Vis08] and [Vis13] for more information.
2.2.1. Vaught Set Theory. We define Vaught set theory, VS as follows. VS1. ∃x ∀y y ∈ x, VS2. ∀u 0 . . . ∀u n−1 ∃x ∀y (y ∈ x ↔ i<n y = u i ). We note that, under the right conventions, VS1 is the special case for n = 0 of VS2.
We also note that we do not have extensionality.
We can define Kuratowski pairing in the usual way. Of course, our pairs will not be extensional and the same pair could be implemented by many entities. We define a function as follows:
• f is a function iff ∀u ∈ f ∀v ∈ f (pair(u) ∧ pair(v) ∧ ((u) 0 = (v) 0 → u = v)). We do not just demand the uniqueness of the output but also the uniqueness of the pair that implements a transition. We define f : x ∼ y iff f is a bijection between x and y, and x ∼ y iff ∃f f : x ∼ y.
We define VS + as VS plus the axioms saying that ∼ is an equivalence relation and that if f : x ∼ y, then x ∼ f .
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. VS dir VS + . Moreover, the relevant interpretation is one-dimensional.
We give the proof in Appendix A. Let R be the very weak arithmetical theory given formulated by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson in their classic [TMR53] . We have:
Theorem 2.2. VS R. Moreover, the relevant interpretation is one-dimensional.
We give the proof in Appendix A.
A theory U is a Vaught theory if U dir VS. A theory U is a Vaught + theory if U dir VS + . In these definitions, we allow the direct interpretation to be moredimensional.
Theorem 2.1 tells us that a Vaught theory is ipso facto a Vaught + theory.
2.2.2. Adjunctive Set Theory. We define adjunctive set theory, AS, as follows: AS1. ∃x ∀y y ∈ x, AS2. ∀u ∀v ∃x ∀y (y ∈ x ↔ (y ∈ u ∨ y = v)). A theory U is sequential if U dir AS. Here we allow the direct interpretation to be more dimensional.
3 Sequentiality is well studied: we refer the reader to [Vis13] for an extensive discussion of the notion.
2 In my earlier papers, I use ≡ for mutual interpretability. However, Lev Beklemishev uses this symbol for other notions of sameness of theories. I think the present notation will eliminate all ambiguity.
3 Thus, our notion of sequentiality is an extension of the usual one. In [Vis13] , I called this notion polysequentiality. However, in the light of the facts that (i) we are just looking at a minor extension of the notion and (ii) the modified notion is clearly the right one, it is high time to redefine the traditional notion.
We present some basic facts concerning sequential theories. We define (for any theory U ):
• (U ) := S 1 2 + { U,n ⊤ | n ∈ ω}.
• A theory U is reflexive if U (U ).
Here the U,n ⊤ are restricted consistency statements for U , where of course U is given by a fixed representation of the axioms and the restriction in both a restriction of the size of the codes of the axioms and of the complexity of the formulas allowed in the proofs. The measure of complexity here is depth of quantifier alternations.
See, e.g., [Vis11] or [Vis18a] .
Here are some basic facts.
(U ) U (this holds for any U ).
2. If U is sequential, then U loc (U ). I.o.w., sequential theories are locally reflexive. 3. If U is reflexive, then U loc V implies U V . 4. Suppose U is sequential and, for all V , we have U loc V implies U V . Then, U is reflexive. 5. Finitely axiomatized sequential theories are not reflexive. (See [Pud85] .)
Basic definitions and insights
In this section we give a precise definition of Ali's question. My main interest is in Ali's question for sequential theories. However, it is good to have a wider definition. Setting things up with a bit more generality will enable us to apply some informal rigour to the choice of notions. We will see that already for Vaught theories, Ali's question makes good sense.
We consider broader and narrower versions of the question. We will show that the question takes its most natural form in the sequential case.
3.1. Basic formulation of the question. We first address the treatment of numerals. What is needed here is that the theories we consider interpret at least some minimal theory successor. For this we choose the theory Succ 0 . The theory Succ 0 has one constant 0 and one binary predicate S. I will use infix notation for S. The axioms of Succ 0 are as follows. We define 0(x) := (x = 0) and (n + 1)(x) := ∃y ( n(y) ∧ y S x).
So, the theory just says that successor behaves normally as long as we are finitely far removed from 0. We have the following small insight.
Theorem 3.1. Succ 0 is a sub-theory of R, where we identify x S y with Sx = y.
Consider any theory U and suppose N : Succ 0 → U . Suppose N is n-ary. We expand the signature of U with a new n-ary predicate T. We write T(n) for:
(In case we want to emphasize the dependence of our numerals on N we write T(n N ).)
The class of sentential Tarski biconditionals TB − N consists of the sentences of the form A ↔ T( A ). Here A is a U -sentence and A is the Gödel number of A. We will usually omit the underlining and simply write T( A ).
We say that N has the Enayat Property or that U is an N -Enayat theory iff
We note that N is part of the data for n and U is part of the data for N and the signature of U is part of the data for U . So, indeed, the notation 'TB − N ' exhibits all the necessary data, with the exception of the Gödel numbering, to construct the intended set of sentences. In most of the paper, we will treat the Gödel numbering as fixed in the back-ground, where the Gödel numbering is supposed to be a standard efficient Gödel numbering. Exceptions are Subsection 3.3 and Section 4. In Subsection 4, we need a non-standard numbering. In Subsection 3.3, we show that, in the Vaught case, the Enayat property does not depend on the Gödel numbering under the appropriate assumptions of Gödel numberings.
Remark 3.2. We note that, even if our framework is fairly general, the theory Succ 0 may be still too restrictive. The point is that nothing really seems to depend on the uniqueness of the numerals as stipulated in Succ 0 3. The only advantage of the present approach is that we can use the numeral notation in a meaningful way. One important advantage of the more general approach, where we drop Succ 0 3, is that also pair theories are covered by the framework. ❍
Here is a first small observation. This observation is well-known. I do not know who first made it.
Intensionality. Enayatness, as defined here, is an intensional property, since, in the general case, it critically depends both on N and on the choice of the Gödel numbering. In Section 4, we will see an example that illustrates these dependencies.
We will see that, in the case that U is a Vaught theory, Enayatness is independent of the Gödel numbering, assuming that all Gödel numberings that we allow are recursively related to some standard Gödel numbering. Secondly, we will see that, for Vaught theories, Enayatness can be considered as a property of theories rather than of interpretations.
In the case of sequential theories, we can even do better: we can give a characterization of Enayatness in which Gödel numerings nor truth are mentioned! 3.3. Enayatness for Vaught theories. We show that, for Vaught theories, the property of Enayatness is independent of the choice of numerals. Moreover, we show that, for Vaught theories, Enayatness is independent of the choice of the Gödel numbering, as long as the Gödel numberings considered are recursively related to a standard one.
We have the following theorem: Proof. We use a minor adaptation of a well-known argument due to Dedekind and Pudlák. See [Pud85] . We define F := F N,M beween δ N and δ M as follows. x F y iff there a partial bijection f between δ N and δ M such that (i) f 0 N = f 0 M , (ii) if x S N y and f y is defined, then f x is defined and f x S M f y. The definition of partial bijection is provided via the direct interpretation of VS in U .
One now easily shows that
We interpret U +TB − M via the translation, say τ , in U +TB − N by taking the identical translation for the U -vocabulary and setting
We have found that, if a Vaught theory has the Enayat property for some N , it has the Enayat property for all N . If a Vaught theory has the Enayat property for some N , we will call it simply an Enayat theory.
Here is a convenient observation.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose U is a Vaught theory. Then U is Enayat iff U interprets U + TB − N , for some N : R U . Here the dimension of N can be taken to be the dimension of the direct interpretation that establishes Vaughtness.
Proof. Consider a Vaught theory U . By Theorem 2.2, U interprets R, say, via N , where N is the composition of the one-dimensional interpretation of R in VS and the direct interpretation of VS in U . It follows that the dimension of N is the dimension of this direct interpretation.
Since R extends Succ 0 , by Theorem 3.1, U interprets Succ 0 via the interpretation N ′ based on τ N . Clearly, U + TB − N is extensionally the same as U + TB − N ′ . So, we are immediately done. ❑ When considering Vaught theories, we will from now on consider interpretations of R.
We address the worry that Enayatness for Vaught theories may be crucially dependent on details of the chosen Gödel numbering.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose we have Gödel numberings ν 0 and ν 1 . We only need to assume that the ν i assign numbers to sentences. Suppose for some recursive function η we have
N . It follows that if U is a Vaught theory that is Enayat for ν 0 , then U is Enayat for ν 1 .
Proof. We assume the conditions of the theorem. In R, we can represent the function η by a formula H. We now define a Fujimoto translation τ as follows.
It is easy to see that τ delivers the goods. ❑
We note that we need not impose any a priori restriction on the complexity of ν 1 for the theorem to work. Of course, our default assumption is that we are working with a reasonable Gödel numbering.
Here is the general form of our conjecture for Vaught theories. U . We can take the dimension of N to be the dimension of the direct interpretation of AS in U that establishes sequentiality.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.5, noting that sequential theories are Vaught and that S 1 2 extends R and that the interpretation of S 1 2 in AS is one-dimensional. ❑
We say that an interpretation K : U V is sententially restricted if, there is an n, such that, for all U -sentences B, there is a V -sentence C, such that ρ(C) ≤ n and
Here ρ is the complexity measure depth-of-quantifier-alternations. See [Vis18b] for a careful treatment of the measure.
Suppose N : S 1 2 V . We say that an interpretation K : U V is strongly sententially restricted w.r.t. N iff, for some V -formula A( x ), where the length of x is the dimension of N , we have that, for all U -sentences B,
Theorem 3.11. Suppose K : U V , where V is sequential and recursively enumerable. Let N : S 1 2 V . Then, K is sententially restricted iff K is strongly sententially restricted (w.r.t. N ).
Proof. The right-to-left direction is immediate, noting that numerals only contribute a constant to the complexity independent of the size of the numeral.
We treat left-to-right. Suppose K : U V is sententially restricted. Let the witnessing number be n. Let γ be the the function that takes as input a U -sentence B, searches for the smallest (coded) V -proof with conclusion of the form B K ↔ C, where ρ(C) ≤ n, and gives as output C. Clearly γ is a total recursive function.
Let True n ( x) be a truth-predicate for V -sentences of complexity ≤ n based on a satisfaction predicate Sat n ( s, x) where we can prove the commutation clauses for formulas of complexity ≤ n that are in a suitable V -provable cut J of N . The length of the sequence x is the dimension of N . We note that, since standard numbers are in J, we have the Tarski biconditionals for True n for sentences of the right complexity. See [Vis18b] for a detailed treatment of partial truth predicates in sequential theories.
We define A( x) := True n (G N ( x)), where G stands for the representation in the arithmetical language of the recursive function γ. Note that we really should have written ∃ y ∈ δ N (G N ( x, y) ∧ True n ( y)). Consider any U -sentence B. Suppose γ(B) = C. We have:
We now have immediately the following consequence.
Theorem 3.12. Let V be sequential. Then, V is an Enayat theory iff V has a sententially restricted self-interpretation.
We note that, for decidable theories, the identity interpretation is restricted. So, having a restricted self-interpretation generally is much broader than being Enayat. We may now formulate the following conjecture:
Conjecture 3.13. No finitely axiomatized consistent sequential theory is Enayat. Equivalently, no finitely axiomatized consistent sequential theory has a sententially restricted self-interpretation. ❍ 3.5. Preservation over mutual interpretability. Surprisingly, Enayatness is preserved for over mutual interpretability if we take R rather than Succ 0 as the basic arithmetical theory that provides the numerals. More precisely we have the following.
Theorem 3.14.
Here the superscript V is there to remind us that we consider TB for the singature of
More graphically, the situation looks like this (using the category theoretical notation for interpretations):
Here τ M is the arithmetization of τ M in N * . We have:
We have the following corollary: We can strengthen our question as follows. We check that T is indeed a functor. Suppose K : U V . Then, we can extend τ K to, say, τ K as follows. Suppose N : R U . We choose T over V w.r.t. the N K-numerals. We extend τ K to τ *
We note that an Enayat Vaught theory is precisely a T-algebra. So, it is immediate that being an Enayat theory is preserved under mutual interpretability which is after all the isomorphism of our category.
Perhaps it is possible to make T work for a better category, but I did not explore this.
Here is an alternative formulation of conjecture 3.7. Let's say that a theory U is quasi-finite iff, for some finitely axiomatized A, we have U ≡ A. To see the equivalence, we present the following consideration. Clearly, if there were a consistent and Vaught Enayat theory A, then T(A) would be quasi-finite. Conversely, suppose U is consistent and Vaught. Suppose T(U ) ≡ A. There is a finitely axiomatized sub-theory V 0 of T(U ) such that V 0 A. We choose V 0 large enough so that it is a Vaught theory. Let U 0 consist of the U -axioms in V 0 . We note that U 0 V 0 , since we can interpret finitely many Tarski biconditionals for free, by Theorem 3.3. Thus, U 0 V 0 A T(U ) T(U 0 ). We may conclude that U 0 is a finitely axiomatized, consistent and Vaught Enayat theory.
A consistent, finitely axiomatized Enayat Theory
Is there a finitely axiomatized theory with the N -Enayat property for appropriate N ? If we ask the question in this generality without further constraints on the admissible theories, there is actually a positive example. The example does depend on what we accept as a Gödel numbering. We discuss the issues here below.
We give an example of a finitely axiomatized theory that is not Enayat for one interpretation (and for any Gödel numbering) and that is Enayat for another interpretation for a special choice of the Gödel numbering.
We consider the theory W := Th 0,S,< (N) of 0, < and S in the natural numbers. See [End01, Section 3.2] for a careful exposition of this theory. The theory W is a finitely axiomatizable complete theory, to wit, the theory of a discrete linear ordering with initial and without final point. Every definable set of numbers in the language of W over N is either finite or cofinite. Moreover, inspection of the quantifier elimination shows that the theory has a multi-exponential decision algorithm.
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Suppose ı is the direct one-dimensional translation of Succ 0 in W that sends 0 to 0 and xSy to Sx = y. Then, clearly, the interpretation K ı of Succ 0 in W based on ı cannot be Enayat for any Gödel numbering since the set of truths is infinite and co-infinite. We cannot get around this example by tweaking the Gödel numbering.
Let W ′ := Th 0,S,<,E (N) be the theory of 0, <, S and E, for even, in the natural numbers Let  be the following two-dimensional translation of the language of W ′ in the language of W .
Clearly, this yields an interpretation K  of W ′ in W based on . We note that it follows that W ′ is multi-exponentially decidable. Let ν be a standard Gödel numbering for the language of W . We define ν * (A) := 2ν(A) if A is true in N and ν * (A) = 2ν(A) + 1 if A is false. Evidently, ν * is a multiexponential Gödel numbering. Let κ translate T to E where κ is the identical translation on the vocabulary of W . Clearly,
Let N be the interpretation of W in W based on  restricted to the language without E. We have ⊤ ◮ W TB −ν * N , showing that Tarski's Theorem on the undefinability of truth fails in our example for a specific choice of Gödel numbering and a specific choice of the numbers. Of course, there is nothing remarkable about this failure, since we do not have the Fixed Point Lemma in this context.
We note that we can do the same trick for, e.g., Presburger Arithmetic. However, Presburger is not finitely axiomatizable.
The reader may object that our Gödel numbering ν * is contrived, unnatural and an ignoble hack. However, it seems very difficult to exclude it on principled reasons. One may want to demand that Gödel numberings are p-time. However, many of the classical Gödel numberings were exponential or even multi-exponential. This is witnessed by, e.g., the Gödel numbering in Feferman's celebrated arithmetization paper [Fef58] .
Open Question 4.1. Is there an example of a finitely axiomatized theory A with the N -Enayat property for some N : Succ 0 A, when we demand that the Gödel numbering is p-time computable? ❍ Open Question 4.2. Is there an example of a finitely axiomatized theory A such that we have the Enayat property for all N : Succ 0 A? ❍
Neighbours
In this section, we discuss uniform variants of TB − . We will see that for the uniform variants we have a clear negative answer -quite unlike the stubborn purely sentential case of TB − .
Remark 5.1. When writing this paper I discovered that much more can be said about uniform biconditionals and Vaught theories. I postpone this to a subsequent paper. ❍
We fix a theory U with an interpretation N : U Succ 0 . In order to avoid heavy and sometimes misleading notations, we assume N to be one-dimensional. Nothing depends on this however.
5.1. Satisfaction. We strengthen TB − N to a uniform principle USB − 1,N in the following way. USB
Here A is a U -formula with at most one free variable v and sat is a new binary predicate. Note that this definition is meaningful also in case our theory is not Vaught.
In case U is Vaught, we also have the following seemingly stronger principle. USB
. . , a( v n−1 ))). Here a ranges over assignments, i.e., partial functions from a finite set of variables to domain objects. If v i is not in the domain, we set value of the variable to some default value x * . Regrettably, in the general case, x * must be a parameter, since there need not be definable elements in the ambient theory U .
Theorem 5.2. Suppose U is a Vaught theory and N : U R. Then, we have USB
Proof. If we start with U + USB − N , we can use Fujimoto translation τ with:
We note that we pretended that we have functionality. In reality, we should have said that there is a representative u of v , a representative w of the pair u, x , a representative z of the set {w}, such that sat(z, y). Moreover, what counts as a representative of u, x , should also be further spelled out. Suppose we start with U + USB − 1,N . We define a recursive function F that sends a code of a formula A(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) to a code of A(v( v 0 ), . . . , v( v n−1 )). Here of course the functions should be unraveled to their relational representations. Par abus de langage, we use F also for the arithmetization of F in R. We now use the following Fujimoto translation ν:
•
Again, unraveling is needed to give the formula its correct form: The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.4. We also have:
Proof. We treat the case of USB − 1,N . We interpret the axioms
Here is a basic insight.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose N : U Succ 0 . Then, (U ) (U + USB − N ), and, similarly for USB − 1,N . Proof sketch. In (U ) we can build a Henkin interpretation H of U . (See [Vis18a] .) This Henkin interpretation comes with a satisfaction predicate H that works on a (U )-cut I. Since (U ) is sequential, there is a definable isomorphism F between a cut of I and a cut of N H. We take sat(x, y) :
We discuss two alternative forms of USB − N . Let us write comm(sat, x) for: for all formulas ≤ x, the predicate sat satisfies the commutation conditions (w.r.t. the signature of U ). Suppose U is a Vaught theory and that N : U R. We define:
As is well known the theory R interprets an extension, say R + , which verifies that ≤ is a linear ordering. See [Vis14b] . Suppose U is a Vaught theory and that
, ∀x ∈ J ∀y ≤ x y ∈ J, n ∈ J, for any n ∈ ω. Here J is a new unary predicate.
We assume that our Gödel coding is monotonic in the sense the the code of a subformula of A is less that the code of A itself. Proof. Ad (a): The inference from Comm − 0,N to USB N is obvious. We treat the case of existential quantification for the other direction. We reason in U + USB N . We writeȃ for a[ v i : v i ], the result of resetting a on v i to v i .
The difference between Comm We note that Comm 
5.2.
Truth. There is also the alternative option of defining a truth principle.
We note that to make sense of this we must stipulate that (i) N is an interpretation of S 1 2 and that (ii) we use efficient numerals, since, for ordinary numerals, the mapping from x to the numeral of x is exponential.
It is not clear to me that, in this case, we have an analogue of Theorem 5.3, i.e., that UTB − N ◮ ◭ U UTB − N ′ . However, as we will see, it is immediate from Theorem 5.12, that these theories are mutually interpretable in the sequential case.
Here is a first small insight.
Theorem 5.8. Let U be sequential and
We have to define the predicate T from sat. Consider a number a. In case a is not an N -code of a U -sentence we make T(a) false. Suppose U is an N -code of a U -sentence. Now we have to analyze a as being a substitution instance of a U -formula b with numerals. There are two obstacles:
• There are not really numerals in b, since we work with a relational signature. So, we have to reverse the term-unwinding translation to obtain the relevant numerals. To do this we need a precise analysis of term-unwinding. Also, we should take care that the reverse algorithm is p-time.
• In the A(˙ x) of UTB − N there could be already numerals in the standard context A(·). However U having just a as input cannot know which numerals are the numerals to replace by variables. Fortunately, it is sufficient to remove numerals maximally. The case where there are some numerals in A(·) can be recovered by substituting some numerals in the result of maximal analysis.
Given that we analyzed a as substitution instance of b where we replace numeral c by variable v, we can compute a corrresponding assignment f that sends v to the value of c. Now we define T(a) by sat(f, b). ❑
We do not generally have that TB
Then, it follows that TB ID ◮ PA UTB ID . Here the lack of the superscript minus means that we extend induction to the full language. However, there is a model of PA + TB − ID that is not recursively saturated, where all models of PA + UTB − ID are recursively saturated. See [Cie17] . ❑ Open Question 5.10. The argument above works for all subtheories of PA that extend R and more, but still it is rather special. Can we improve it to show that the result holds for all sequential theories? ❍ 5.3. . We now connect uniform biconditionals with the -functor.
Theorem 5.11. Suppose U is sequential and
Proof sketch. In U + UTB − N , we can define the intersection J of all virtual classes {x ∈ δ N | T(a(ẋ))} that are N -cuts. One can show that J is an N -cut contained in all U -definable cuts. Thus, in J , we have all restricted consistency statements of U . ❑
We partially summarize the above in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.12. Suppose U is sequential and N : U S 1 2 . Then, following theories are mutually interpretable:
As a consequence, a sequential theory is uniformly Enayat, in any of the possible senses, iff it is reflexive. Proof. We have:
• (U ) (U + USB We note that theories like PRA and PA and ZF are reflexive and, hence, sequential uniform Enayat theories. We also note that the characterization of (U ) as U + USB − N (modulo mutual interpretability) has the advantage of having the Gödel numbering as conventional element, but not the proof system, the arithmetization of the proof system and the like.
The following corollary is immediate. Consider a theory U of signature Θ 0 . Let Θ 1 be Θ 0 extended with a unary predicate T and let Θ 2 be binary predicate symbol sat. The variables α, β, . . . range over sentences of Θ 2 . We take as the default that a theory has as signature the minimal signature demanded by its axioms.
In this vocabulary, we can state Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth as follows. In the next theorem, we show that there is no 'best', in the sense of 'weakest', finite extension of a Vaught theory U in an extended signature that Fujimoto interprets TB − N over U . So, certainly the commutation conditions, as articulated by ∀x ∈ δ N comm(sat, x), are not 'best'. Theorem 6.3. Suppose U is a consistent Vaught theory and N : U R.
The proof is a variation of proof of Theorem 4.1, case (A), of [PV19] .
Proof. Suppose A is of the form ∃x ∈ δ N A 0 (x). We write C(A), for 'if there is no witness x of A such that x ≤ y, then comm(sat, y)'. In other words, C(A) is ¬ ((∃y ∈ δ N ¬ comm(sat, y)) ≤ A).
We write δ ◮ U η as ∃p ∃τ proof U+δ (p, η τ ). By the Fixed Point Lemma, we find B such that R ⊢ B ↔ C(B N ) ◮ U α. We take β := C(B N ). Suppose β ◮ U α. Then, we find that B is true and, hence, B has a standard witness inside U, N . However, finitely many commutation conditions are Fujimotointerpretable in U , by the combination of Theorems 5.4 and 5.6(a). Hence, we have 
We can put further demands on U and N : that U be sequential, finitely axiomatized, etcetera; that N is an interpretation of S We note that the Tarski commutation conditions, are an example of such an α. We note that the construction in the proof of Theorem 6.3 does not immediately help to refute the conjecture. However, it cannot be excluded that some variant of the argument does refute the conjecture.
Remark 6.6. Conjecture 6.5 can be connected to the Davidsonian idea that we need compositionality to obtain a finite axiomatization of the Tarski Biconditionals. ❍ Remark 6.7. The only paper I could find asking a question in the neighbourhood of Conjecture 6.5 is [FM84] . However, Fine and McCarthy work with what they call segregated languages. Their format does not seem to fit ours. Moreover, they do not work with Fujimoto interpretability. It would be well worth exploring what of their work can be adapted to our context. ❍ Remark 6.8. Conjecture 6.5 suggests the concept of Fujimoto preservativity . We define:
• Γ U ∆ iff, for all α such that α ◮ U Γ, we have α ◮ U ∆.
Here, the most elegant approach is to take α, Γ and ∆ to be in the language of U expanded with a binary predicate. We also want to apply the notion if one of the expansions is to unary, but we can choose some standard way to let a binary predicate pose as a unary one, e.g., we might take 
A provability predicate
In the present section we follow the Saccheri strategy. We assume that we have a finitely axiomatized, sequential A that is Enayat. We pretend that it is consistent and explore it as an interesting new world. 
). By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we find L such that A ⊢ L ↔ ¬ KL. We can see that the truth value of L has to alternate if we travel inside K,
However, nothing paradoxical follows.
5
We can see that without some further idea nothing paradoxical can follow, since if U is e.g. EA + {con n (EA) | n ∈ ω} we do have that (i) U is a restricted theory in the sense that the complexity of all its axioms is bounded by a fixed n and (ii) U is reflexive for the identical interpretation and, so, U (U + TB − IDU ). Thus, we need to add an ingredient that essentially uses the fact the A is finitely axiomatized rather than just restricted. In this section, this ingredient is the use of a new provability predicate for A, the good properties of which are based on A's finite axiomatizability. In Section 8, the ingredient is the use of a conjecture that is supposed to hold only for finitely axiomatizable sequential theories.
7.2. What we fix. In this section, we consider a number of things as fixed:
i. the theory A itself; ii. the interpretation S that witnesses the sequentiality of A; we note that, by cutelimination, the proof of AS S can be taken to have complexity max(ρ(A), ρ(S))+ a 0 ; here a 0 is a constant for overhead. iii. the interpretation N 0 of S 1 2 ; we note that, by cut-elimination, the proof of (S 1 2 ) N0 can be taken to have complexity max(ρ(A), ρ(N 0 )) + a 1 ; we note that, since there is a known interpretation of S 1 2 in AS, there is an N 0 of complexity ρ(S) + a 2 ; iv. the interpretation K of A + TB − N0 in A. We note that the complexity of K(n) is ρ(K) + ρ(N 0 ) + a 3 , where a 3 is a constant for overhead. 7.3. The provability predicate. Let n ≥ a * := max(ρ(A), ρ(K) + ρ(N 0 )) + a, where a is suitable constant number that is needed for the overhead in our reasoning. We note that in the context of our reasoning a * functions as a constant since we treat A, K and N 0 as fixed.
Our new provability predicate is △ A,(n) B := A,n KB. We note that n ≥ a * is precisely what is needed to make △ A,(n) a meaningful notion. We use subscript (n) rather that n to remind the reader that the subscript is not a constraint on the sentences for which our predicate is meaningful.
We will omit the subscript A since A is fixed in this section and we will have to work with a whole circus of sub-and superscripts anyway.
We remind the reader of the Löb conditions. For a brief moment, we view △ as an abstract operator.
We will also consider the condition C, to wit:
In the next subsection, we discuss variants of L1 and L2 for the predicate △ 
We also have a second form that is a better 'externalisation' of L3.
Proof. Ad (A): Suppose A ⊢ B. Then, A ⊢ B K and, hence, A ⊢ KB. By cutelimination, we have A ⊢ n KB. By Σ 1 -completeness, in the meta-theory, we find S
As the reader can see, n is, in this theorem, not constrained by N . The reason is that, since N is initial in N 0 , the N -numerals simply are the N 0 -numerals. We note that in both proofs we used cut-elimination. Thus, the proofs can be executed in meta-theory EA + , i.e., I∆ 0 + supexp. So, we have:
However, on closer inspection, we have a much better result. We suppose that A, n, N and K are externally given. Then, the first form only requires S 1 2 and the second form only requires EA := I∆ 0 + exp. We will discuss this in detail when we consider proofs of L3 in the next subsection. 
. By L2 for n , we find:
We note that there does not seem to be a way to prove the uniform version
. The quantifier over sentences seems essentially external.
Remark 7.3. With the first Löb condition in hand, we can immediately prove the well-known properties of the Gödel sentences. Let N and n be as before. By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we find G N,n := G such that S
On the other hand, by the Fixed
It follows that A ⊢ ⊥. We cannot similarly derive Löb's Rule as will be illustrated in Subsection 7.5. The derivation of the Rule does need some form of L3. ❍ 7.5. Guarded reflection. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 7.4. For any n, there is an A-definable, A-verifiable N 0 -cut I n with ρ-complexity of order bn + max(ρ(S), ρ(N 0 )) + c, such that, for all B with ρ(B) ≤ n, we have A ⊢ In n B → B. See [Vis18b] , for a careful treatment of this result (or, rather, a result of which this result is an immediate consequence). We now have a form of guarded reflection for △.
As preparation for Remark 7.7, we formulate a well-know lemma that is due to Pudlák. See [Pud85] .
There is an N -cut C N,N ′ and a definable isomorphic embedding F N,N ′ : C N,N ′ → N ′ . We have:
We write ▽ for ¬△¬. One thing one could try, in order to get the effect of the above reasoning, is to get under the guard using Lemma 7.6. We have a brief look, to see why this idea fails. Suppose N is a cut both of I n and C N0,N0K .
We first try G N,n . We reason in A. Suppose △ The result of these two attempts is somewhat disappointing. However, we will see in Subsection 7.7 that a Gödel-style argument does give us some information about K. ❍ 7.6. The third and fourth Löb condition. We write for provability in S 1 2 . We define itexp(0, x) := x and itexp(y + 1, x) := 2 itexp(y,x) . We start with a lemma.
Lemma 7.8. Suppose n ≥ max(ρ(A), ρ(B)). We have S 1 2 ⊢ B → n B. Proof. We use the version of cut-elimination from Buss' paper [Bus15] . By formalizing Buss' result, we have, S 1 2 -verifiably, that whenever p is a proof and whenever itexp(ρ(p) + 2, p) exists, then we have a cut-free proof q with the same conclusion.
Secondly, we use an insight from Pudlák's paper [Pud85] , that,
We reason as follows inside S 1 2 . Suppose p is an A-proof of B. Then, ρ(p) is a logarithmic number. So ∃z itexp(ρ(p) + 2, p) = z. We also find proof A (p, B) . Hence, inside we have a cut-free proof q that witnesses n B. ❑ Let N and N ′ be A-definable, A-verifiable cuts of N 0 and let n ≥ a * . We first internalize Theorem 7.1(A).
Theorem 7.9. We have S 1 2 ⊢ B → △ (n) B, and, hence, S
Proof. The proof is an internalization and refinement of the proof of Theorem 7.1(A). We note that externally we have A ⊢ B K ↔ KB, and, thus, S
Then, since A is finitely axiomatized and interpretations give p-time transformations of proofs, we have B K . Hence, by ( †), KB. By Lemma 7.8, it follows that n KB, i.o.w., △ (n) B. ❑
We proceed with an internalization of Theorem 7.1(B). Let N and N ′ be as before. Let n ≥ a * . We use a slightly more general formulation with an extra m for later use. 
Note that this makes sense only under our assumption on m. By Σ 1 -completeness, we find:
By specializing Theorem 7.10, we find:
. Now, putting m = n, L4 follows in the usual way from L1,2,3 in combination with the Fixed Point Lemma.
Theorem 7.12. Under the assumption that n ≥ ρ(K) + ρ(N ) + f, we have:
Hence, we have:
Assuming A to be consistent, we note that, for any n and N satisfying the assumption of Theorem 7.12, we cannot have guarded reflection for △ N (n) . Otherwise, we would have both Löb's Theorem and guarded reflection at the same time. But this is impossible since it would follow that A ⊢ ▽ N,(n) ⊤.
We can give an alternative form of L3 where we eliminate the lower bound on n at the cost of relativizing the antecedent to a cut. 
The proof is essentially contained in [Pud83] or [Pud85] . Given any cut I, we consider the virtual class {x | 2 x ∈ I}. This class is downward closed and closed under successor. We shorten it to a cut J. Inspecting the construction, clearly, ρ(J) = ρ(I) + g. We obtain J m by iterating the construction starting from the identical cut.
Ad ( KB. Let the witnessing proof be p. Since p ∈ J m+2 , we find, by (1), that itexp(m + 2, p) exists. So, by the cut-elimation theorem from [Bus15] , we find a * KB, so, a fortiori,
❑ It is always good to have an alternative proof of a result. In the proof of Theorem 7.13, we used S 1 2 -formalization of Buss' result of [Bus15] , a delicate result that involves many details. So, it improves our confidence to have a variant of Theorem 7.13(2), with a different proof.
We write K for ¬K¬. Let H C : (S 1 2 + a * KC) (A + KC) be the Henkin interpretation based on a * KC. See [Vis18a] . We note that H C is uniform in C. We can view 'C' as a variable. Let D m be the common cut in S 1 2 of the identical interpretation and all the I m H C , for C such that a * KC. We note that the complexity of H C is a small standard number independent of C. So, ρ(D m ) is ρ(I m ) plus some standard constant.
Theorem 7.14. Suppose m, n ≥ a
Proof. We reason in S 1 2 . Suppose n KC. Then, a fortiori, we have a * KC and, hence, (A + KC)
HC . So, we have, by reasoning inside H C , that
by the definition of D m , we find Dm (m) KC. We return to the meta-language. We note that A ⊢ K¬ B ↔ ¬ KB, and, hence A ⊢ n K¬ B ↔ ¬ KB and A ⊢ m K¬ B ↔ ¬ KB. So, S 1 2 ⊢ n K¬ B ↔ n ¬ KB and, similarly, for m. Hence, putting C := ¬ B, we obtain our desired result. ❑ Let S be again Σ b 1 , let N again be a cut of N 0 and let again n ≥ a * . Let m
Proof. We reason in S 1 2 . Suppose S J m * +2 . By Theorem 7.10, we have △
By Theorem 7.13, it follows that △ n S N . ❑ By specializing we find the following. Let m
We have the following extension of Theorem 7.15. This version could play a role in the development of Rosser arguments. Let S be Σ 0 1 , let N be a cut of N 0 and let
Proof. This uses the well-known fact that S 1 2 ⊢ S J2 → ρ(S)+i S. See [HP93] . Here i s a small constant for overhead. ❑ Remark 7.18. Suppose N is shorter than I n . Let G := G N,n . We reason in A.
Quod non. So, canceling our assumption, we find ¬ △ JnN (n) G N and, thus, G JnN . Note the analogy of the present result with the result of Remark 7.7. ❍ 7.7. Under guard. In this subsection, we extract some information from the Gödel sentences for △ (a * ) . Let ℑ := I a * ∩ C N0,N0K .
We note that F N0,N0K restricted to N is an isomorphism between N and N K. Moreover, N ⊆ ℑ. Let G := G N,a * . 6 6 Strictly speaking, we exceed our earlier framework here, since A need not prove that N is a cut of N 0 . However, it is easy to see that the marginal extensions does no harm. The skeptical reader can always replace N by N cut N 0 (N ) N 0 , the interpretation that is N if N is indeed an N 0 -cut and that is N 0 otherwise.
On the other hand, by guarded reflection, we have G N K . A contradiction. Hence, by canceling our assumption, ¬△ N (a * ) G N , and so G N K .
We return to the meta-language. We have shown that
Theorem 7.20. Suppose A is consistent. Then, A + X is also consistent.
Proof. Suppose A + X is inconsistent. Then, for some finite subset X 0 of X , we have A ⊢ ¬ X 0 . Let Y 0 be the set of N such that ℑ * ⊂ N K is in X 0 . We have: 7.8. Rosser? In this section we discussed the predicate △ and have shown that it has many good properties. In Remarks 7.3, 7.7, 7.18 and in Subsection 7.7, we explored what information the Gödel sentences of △ could provide. However, as we seen our information until now makes △ too well behaved to obtain a contradiction. There is clearly an infinity of variations on the Rosser sentences and there is some hope that these might lead to the desired contradiction.
In search of paradox
In this Section we study an attempt to prove Conjecture 3.13 that has some analogies to a paradox, variants of which were independently found by Stephen Yablo and the author. 8.1. Motivating remarks. We consider a finitely axiomatized, sequential A with the Enayat property. Let N 0 : S 1 2 → A and let K be defined with respect to N 0 as before. Let us briefly dwell on the Liar for K. By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we Nothing dangerous seems to follow from the existence of L since we only get the alternations. Can be eliminate the alternations by stipulating that L is false in all iterations of K? Consider
K . Now if x were in the common cut C N0,N0K , we would have our contradiction. So, it follows that N 0 K contains an element above the common cut. Suppose we start with ¬ L * , we get
Can we tweak the argument in such a way that the existential claim gets a numerical witness? If we could, we would have
. By the fixed point equation, we find A ⊢ (¬ KL * ) K n+1 , and,
On the other hand, since K interprets A in A, we find
. So, A is inconsistent. The above program does not quite work. In the first place, we need to add some subtle details. In the second place, and more importantly, we need a substantial conjecture to make it work. However, this conjecture has some interest of its own. The Small-is-very-small Principle, or SIVS, tells us that, if a restricted theory proves that a number with a certain property exists in a sufficiently small cut ('is small') then the theory also believes that the number is standard ('is very small'). Here the relevant small cut will depend on the property, or, more precisely the complexity of the formula defining the property. U . Let B be of the form ∃x ∈ N 0 B 0 (x). Let ℓ be max(k, ρ(B)) plus some constant j for overhead.
Here I ℓ is the cut that was introduced in Subsection 7.5. The numeral m is an N 0 -numeral.
The proof of Theorem 8.2 is given in full detail in [Vis18b] . Here we provide a quick sketch. Suppose C is ∃x ∈ δ N0 C 0 and D is ∃y ∈ δ N0 D 0 . We write C ≤ D for ∃x ∈ δ N0 (C 0 ∧ ∀y < N0 x ¬ D 0 ).
Proof-sketch. We work under the conditions specified in the theorem. 7 We will worry about details of defining the iteration of K later.
Suppose U ⊢ ∃x ∈ I ℓ B 0 (x). It follows that there is a finite subsystem U 0 of U such that U 0 ⊢ ∃x ∈ I ℓ B 0 (x). We may assume that U 0 is sequential and verifies
U0,ℓ R is not witnessed in I ℓ , we have R by the fixed point equation. If N0 U0,ℓ R is witnessed in I ℓ , we have R by reflection. We return to the meta-language.
We have shown U 0 ⊢ R. By cut-elimination, we find U 0 ⊢ ℓ R. Let m witness U 0 ⊢ ℓ R. By Σ 1 -completeness, we find, in U 0 , that B is witnessed below m. ❑ Example 8.3. Let U be a variant of PRA in the arithmetical language. Then U is a consistent restricted sequential theory. Let N 0 be the identical interpretation. Since, U is also reflexive, we can find an interpretation M such that M : U U and U ⊢ IM U ⊥, for all definable N 0 -cuts I. It is obvious that we cannot have
So, we do not have an analogue for Theorem 8.2, if we embed our existential sentence in a self-interpretation M . Intuitively, viewed from the standpoint of the world of U , the cuts definable inside M , seen from the outside, cannot be as small as the cuts we have at the general level of the theory. ❍
We can escape the above example is we restrict ourselves to finitely axiomatized theories A and restrict B to (Σ We lost the restriction on the complexity of the existentially quantified formula from Theorem 8.2 by a small trick. The proof of this result can be found in [Vis93] or [Vis05] . The essence of the trick in also given in the proof of Theorem 8.7 below.
We note that Theorem 8.4 contains both a restriction of the theory (it has to be finitely axiomatized) and on the formula (it has to be (Σ A. Consider any number n. There is an N 0 -cut I n such that, for any sentence B := ∃x ∈ N B 0 (x) with ρ(B) ≤ n and any M : A A with ρ(M ) ≤ n, we have:
Here the m is an N 0 -numeral. We note that ( †) is equivalent to:
❍
The conjecture could just turn out to be provable by a slightly more clever Rosser argument than the ones I employed until now. My first attempts ran into the same kind of problems as my attempts to prove the truth of Conjecture 3.13 directly: somewhere a K on an undesired place. How to get rid of it?
There is an interesting equivalent of Conjecture 8.5.
Conjecture 8.6. Consider a finitely axiomatized sequential theory A and let N 0 : S 1 2
A. Consider any number n. There is an N 0 -cut J n such that, for any Σ 0 1 -sentence S and for any sentence C with ρ(C) ≤ n and any M : A A with ρ(M ) ≤ n, we have:
We note that, if we put ⊥ for C, then we get something that is known, to wit Theorem 8.4. ] for a detailed treatment. We will write true(S) for true( S ). We note that ρ(true(S)) is a fixed standard number z independent of S. Let true(x) be ∃y true 0 (y, x), where true 0 ∈ ∆ 0 . Let J n := J 1 I max(n,z+1) . where I n is provided by Conjecture 8.5. Consider any C and K with complexities below n. Let n ′ := max(n, z + 1). We have:
The last step uses that if ¬ true 0 (k, S) is true, then A ⊢ ¬ true N0M 0 (k, S). Conjecture 8.6 implies Conjecture 8.5. Suppose we have Conjecture 8.6. The proof uses an idea from [Fri75] . Let n be given. Let n ′ be n plus a constant for overhead. We will be more specific about the choice of the constant later. Let I n := J n ′ . Suppose we have B and M , where ρ(B) and ρ(M ) are ≤ n.
Suppose A ⊢ (∃x ∈ I n B 0 (x)) M . By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we find R such that A ⊢ R ↔ B ≤ N0 R M . We note that the complexity of R is the complexity of B plus a constant y that just depends on N 0 and the arithmetization of provability. So, traveling back in time, we take n ′ := n + y. It is easy to see ). Let F := F N0,N0K be a definable isomorphism between the cut C := C N0,N0K of the N 0 -numbers and its image in the N 0 K-numbers.
We define the function γ(y, x) as follows:
Here subst is the substitution function and num assigns to a number the Gödel number of its numeral. Par abus de langage, we also write γ for the arithmetization of γ. The function γ is defined on the logarithmic numbers of N 0 . Let N 1 be a logarithmic cut, e.g.
Here is the main result of this section. ). We derive a contradiction.
Let n * := max(2ρ(K), ρ(K(x))) + 2. We clearly may assume that I n * is a logarithmic cut in N 0 , by shortening it when needed. We use the fixed point lemma to obtain:
We apply Conjecture 8.5 to obtain, for some m:
, and, hence, that
On the other hand, by the definition of L, and ( ‡), we find:
Remark 8.9. We note that the construction K := KK L K preserves sentential restrictedness. So, we need Conjecture 8.5 only for a very special kind of interpretation -that does not even need to exist, given the fact that we are looking for a reductio. ❍ Proof. We define PC 0 as the virtual class of all x such that
Suppose x is in PC 0 and x ∼ y. We show y ∈ PC 0 .
Ad (1) We have x ∼ y ∧ x ∼ y. Hence, by (2) for x, y ∼ y. Ad (2) Suppose y ∼ z and y ∼ u. it follows that x ∼ y ∼ z and x ∼ y ∼ u. Hence, by (3) for x, we find x ∼ z and x ∼ u. Ergo, by (2), z ∼ u. Ad (3) Suppose y ∼ z ∼ u. it follows that x ∼ y ∼ z, hence, by (3) for x, we find x ∼ z. It follows that x ∼ z ∼ u, hence, by (3) for x, we find x ∼ u. So we have x ∼ y and x ∼ u, so, by (2) for x, we have y ∼ u.
The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on PC 0 . The only thing to check is symmetry. Consider x ∈ PC 0 and suppose x ∼ y. We have x ∼ y ∧ x ∼ x and, so, by (2), y ∼ x.
We define PC 1 as the class of x in PC 0 such that
We note that ∼ is an equivalence relation on PC 1 . We show that PC 1 is closed under ∼. Suppose PC 1 (x) and x ∼ y and y ∼ u ∼ v and f : u ∼ v. Then, since PC 0 (x), we have x ∼ u ∼ v and f : u ∼ v. So, we may conclude u ∼ f .
Finally, if PC 1 (x) and f : x ∼ y, then x ∼ x ∼ y and f : x ∼ y, and, so x ∼ f , and, hence PC 1 (f ).
We now define u ∈ + v iff u ∈ v ∧ PC 1 (v). We claim that we have VS + for ∈ + . We note that, whenever x is in PC 1 , it defines the same set for ∈ and for ∈ + . Also, any non-empty ∈ + -set x will be in PC 1 . Clearly, any ∈-finite set will be in PC 1 . Thus, it will have the same ∈ + -elements. In other words, finite sets are absolute with respect to our interpretation. It follows that we have the VS-axioms for ∈ + . Since, Kuratowski pairs are constructed using finite sets, we easily see that Kuratowski pairs are absolute too. It follows that, whenever, f is an ∈-function that is in PC 1 , then f is also ∈ + -function with the same input-output behavior. Let u ∼ + v be defined like ∼ with ∈ replaced by ∈ + . We claim ( †) for x in PC 1 , we have x ∼ y iff x ∼ + y. First suppose f : x ∼ y. Clearly, f and y will be in PC 1 , hence f : x ∼ + y. Conversely, suppose g : x ∼ + y. In case x is ∈ + -empty, x will be ∈-empty, since x ∈ PC 1 . Hence, x : x ∼ y. In case, x is ∈ + -non-empty, also y and g will be ∈ + -non-empty. Hence, they are in PC 1 . It follows that g : x ∼ y. Consider any x. In case x is ∈ + -empty, we have x : x ∼ + x. In case x is ∈ + -non-empty, it is in PC 1 , hence x ∼ x, and, so, by ( †), x ∼ + x. Consider any x and y with x ∼ + y. In case x is ∈ + -empty, we have x : y ∼ + x. Suppose x is ∈ + -non-empty. Then, x is in PC 1 . It follows, by ( †), that x ∼ y, and hence, that y is in PC 1 and y ∼ x. Hence, by ( †), y ∼ + x. Suppose x ∼ + y ∼ + z. If x is ∈ + -empty, y will be ∈ + -empty and so will be z. Hence, x : x ∼ + z. Suppose x is ∈ + -non-empty. It follows that x is in PC 1 . Hence, by ( †), x ∼ y, y is in PC 1 and y ∼ z. So x ∼ z. Again by ( †), x ∼ + z.
Finally, suppose f : x ∼ + y. In case x is ∈ + -empty, we find that f is ∈ + -empty, and, hence, x : x ∼ + f . Suppose x is ∈ + -non-empty, then so are y and f . Then x, y and f are in PC 1 , and, hence, f : x ∼ y. It follows that x ∼ f and, hence, by ( †), that x ∼ + f . ❑ Our next order of business is to prove Theorem 2.2, to wit that VS R via a onedimensional interpretation. There are two possible proofs. I will give (a sketch of) both.
First proof: By Theorem 2.1 it suffices to prove that VS + R. The basic idea of our interpretation is to give the usual cardinal definitions of the arithmetical operations whenever they work. When they do not work we set them to a default value.
We write pair(x, y, z) for: z represents a Kuratowski pair with first component x and second component y.
We call our translation ρ. We define:
• δ ρ (x) := (x = x), • x = ρ y := x ∼ y, • Z ρ (x) := ∀y y ∈ x, • adj(x, y, z) := ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u = y)), • S 0 (x, y) := ∃z (z ∈ x ∧ adj(x, z, y)),
• S 1 (x, y) := ∃u ∃v (S 0 (u, v) ∧ x ∼ u ∧ v ∼ y),
• S 2 (x, y) := S 1 (x, y) ∧ ∀z (S 1 (x, z) → y ∼ z),
• S ρ (x, y) := S 2 (x, y) ∨ (∀z ¬ S 2 (x, z) ∧ x ∼ y),
• U(x, y, z) := ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u ∈ y)), • A 0 (x, y, z) := ∀u ¬ (u ∈ x ∧ u ∈ y) ∧ U(x, y, z),
• A 1 (x, y, z) := ∃u ∃v ∃w (A 0 (u, v, w) ∧ x ∼ u ∧ y ∼ v ∧ z ∼ w),
• A 2 (x, y, z) := A 1 (x, y, z) ∧ ∀u (A 1 (x, y, u) → z ∼ u),
• A ρ (x, y, z) := A 2 (x, y, z) ∨ (∀u ¬ A 2 (x, y, u) ∧ z ∼ y), • M 0 (x, y, z) := ∀u ∈ x ∀v ∈ y ∃w ∈ z pair(u, v, w) ∧ ∀w ∈ z ∃u ∈ x ∃v ∈ y pair(u, v, w) ∧ ∀p ∈ z ∀q ∈ z ∀u ∈ x ∀v ∈ y ((pair(u, v, p) ∧ pair(u, v, q)) → p = q), • M 1 (x, y, z) := ∃u ∃v ∃w (M 0 (u, v, w) ∧ x ∼ u ∧ y ∼ v ∧ z ∼ w), • M 2 (x, y, z) := M 1 (x, y, z) ∧ ∀u (M 1 (x, y, u) → z ∼ u), • M ρ (x, y, z) := M 2 (x, y, z) ∨ (∀u ¬ M 2 (x, y, u) ∧ z ∼ y), It is clear that on the standardly finite sets our operations behave as the ordinary successor, sum and product. Moreover, ≤ defined as x ≤ y := ∃z (z + x = y) behaves as usual. Thus, ρ carries an interpretation of R. ❑ Remark A.1. We note that we could manipulate the interpretation of ∈ further in order to interpret principles like:
• ∀x ∀y ∀z ∀u ∀v ((x ∼ y ∧ u ∈ x ∧ v ∈ y ∧ adj(x, u, z)) → ∃w adj(y, v, w)). Clearly, in the presence of such principles, we can build an interpretation following the above strategy that is simpler. ❍ Second proof. We interpret the theory of a category in VS. We define Ob as the class of x such that ∃i : x → x ∀y ∈ x i(y) = y and ∀y ∀z ∀f : x → y ∀g : y → z ∃h : x → z ∀u ∈ x f (g(u)) = h(u).
We define Morph as the functions between the elements of Ob and we take as identity on Morph extensional sameness. We define identity arrows and composition in the obvious way. It is easy to see Ob and Morph with the chosen operations define a category in VS and that the standardly finite sets are in Ob.
We now define sum(x, y, z) and prod(x, y, z) as the category-theoretical sum and product. We note that these are partial operations but have verifiably good properties like commutativity and associativity.
Finally we define our interpretation, say ν, of R by taking:
• δ ν := Ob, • = ν is isomorphism in our category, • Z ν (x) := ∀y y ∈ x, • A ν (x, y, z) := sum(x, y, z) ∨ (∀w ¬ sum(x, y, w) ∧ z = ν y),
• sing(x) := ∃y ∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z = y),
• S ν (x, y) := ∃z (sing(z) ∧ A ν (x, z, y)),
• M ν (x, y, z) := prod(x, y, z) ∨ (∀w ¬ prod(x, y, w) ∧ z = ν y).
The rest of the proof is as expected. ❑
It follows that ( ‡) A ⊢ j≤m+k+1 L K j+1 .
Since K : A A, it follows that A ⊢ ( j≤m+1 L 
